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Socrates's divine gift: gods, providence, and *daimonion*

T1) Diogenes Laertius, 2.40:

The indictment against him was drawn up as follows (for it is still available today in the Metröon, says Favorinus): “This complaint was lodged under oath by Meletus, son of Meletus of Pitthos, against Socrates, son of Sophroniscus of Alopece: Socrates breaks the law because he does not recognize the gods recognized by the city, and because he introduces other new daemonic beings (ἕτερα... καινὰ δαιμόνια); and he breaks the law because he corrupts the youth. The penalty is death.” (trans. Mensch, adapted)

T2) Plato, *Apology*, 26a-b:

SOCRATES: Tell us, Meletus, how can you say that I corrupt the young? Or is it clear from your deposition that it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods (θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν) in whom the city believes but in other new daemonic beings (ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά)? Don't you say that by teaching those [daemonic beings] I corrupt them (ταῦτα.. ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω)?

MELETUS: That is most certainly what I do say. (trans. Grube, adapted)

T3) Plato, *Apology*, 21a:

SOCRATES: You know Chaerephon... He once went to Delphi and ventured to ask the oracle... he asked if any man was wiser than I, and the Pythia replied that no one was wiser (μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι). (trans. Grube, adapted)

T4) Plato, *Apology*, 21b:

SOCRATES: When I heard of this reply I asked myself: “Whatever does the god mean? What is his riddle? I know for sure that I am not wise either much or little (οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν σύννοϊδα); what then does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For surely he does not lie; it is not legitimate (οὐ... θέμις) for him to do so.” (trans. Grube, adapted)

T5) Plato, *Apology*, 21b-c:

SOCRATES: For a long time I was at a loss as to what the god meant; then I very reluctantly turned to some such investigation (ζήτησιν) as this; I went to one of those reputed wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I could refute (ἐλέγξω) the oracle and say to it: “This man is wiser than I, but you said I was.” (trans. Grube, adapted)

T6) Plato, *Apology*, 21e-22a:

SOCRATES: After that I proceeded systematically. I realized, to my sorrow and alarm, that I was getting hated, but I thought that it was necessary to attach the greatest importance to the god's oracle (ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι), so I must go (ιτέον) to all those who had any reputation for knowledge to examine (σκοποῦντι) its meaning. (trans. Grube, adapted)

T7) Plato, *Apology*, 22a:

SOCRATES: In my investigation on account of the god (ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν) I found that those who had the highest reputation were nearly the most deficient, while those who were thought to be

inferior were more knowledgeable. I must give you an account of my journeyings, of the labors I had undertaken (πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος) to prove to me that the oracle might be irrefutable (ἴνα μοι... ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο ἀνέλεγκτος). (trans. Grube, adapted)

T8) Plato, *Apology*, 22c-e:

SOCRATES: Finally I went to the craftsmen, for I was conscious of knowing practically nothing, and I knew that I would find that they had knowledge of many fine things. In this I was not mistaken; they knew things I did not know, and to that extent they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, the good craftsmen seemed to me to have the same fault as the poets: each of them, because of his success at his craft, thought himself very wise in other most important pursuits, and this error (πλημμέλεια) of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they had, so that I asked myself, on behalf of the oracle (ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ), whether I should prefer to be as I am (πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν), with neither their wisdom nor their ignorance, or to have both. The answer I gave myself and the oracle was that it was to my advantage to be as I am (ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν). (trans. Grube)

T9) Plato, *Apology*, 23b-c:

SOCRATES: So even now I continue this investigation on account of the god (κατὰ τὸν θεὸν)—and I go around seeking out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom I think wise. Then if I do not think he is, I help the god (τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν) and show him that he is not wise. Because of this occupation, I do not have the leisure to engage in public affairs to any extent, nor indeed to look after my own, but I live in great poverty because of my worship of the god (τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν). (trans. Grube)

T10) Plato, *Apology*, 28d-29a:

SOCRATES: This is the truth of the matter, men of Athens: wherever a man has taken a position that he believes to be best, or has been placed by his commander (ὑπ' ἄρχοντος), there he must I think remain and face danger, without a thought for death or anything else, rather than disgrace. It would have been dreadful, men of Athens, if, at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium, I had, at the risk of death, like anyone else, remained at my post where those you had elected to command had ordered me, and then, when the god ordered me (τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος), as I thought and believed, to live the life of a philosopher, to refute myself and others (φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους), I had abandoned my post for fear of death or anything else. That would have been a dreadful thing, and then I might truly have justly been brought here for not believing that there are gods, disobeying the oracle (ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ), fearing death, and thinking I was wise when I was not. (trans. Grube, adapted)

T11) Plato, *Apology*, 29d:

SOCRATES: “Men of Athens, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to any one of you whom I happen to meet: ‘Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?’

Then, if one of you disputes this and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once or leave him, but I shall question him, examine him and test him, and if I do not think he has attained the goodness that he says he has, I shall reproach him because he attaches little importance to the most important things and greater importance to inferior things. I shall treat in this way anyone I happen to meet, young and old, citizen and stranger, and more so the citizens because you are more kindred to me. Be sure that this is what the god orders me to do (ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός), and I think

there is no greater good for the city (οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει) than my service to the god (τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν). (trans. Grube, adapted)

T12) Plato, *Euthyphro*, 13d-e:

SOCRATES: Very well, but what kind of care (θεῶν θεραπεία) for the gods would piety be?

EUTHYPHRO: The kind of care, Socrates, when slaves care about (θεραπεύουσιν) their masters.

SOCRATES: I understand. It is likely to be a kind of service of the gods.

EUTHYPHRO: Quite so.

SOCRATES: Could you tell me to the achievement of what deed (ἔργου) the service to doctors tends? Is it not, do you think, to achieving health?

EUTHYPHRO: I think so.

SOCRATES: What about service to shipbuilders? To what achievement is it directed?

EUTHYPHRO: Clearly, Socrates, to the building of a ship.

SOCRATES: And service to housebuilders to the building of a house?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Tell me then, my good sir, to the achievement of what aim does service to the gods tend? You obviously know since you say that you, of all men, have the best knowledge of the divine.

EUTHYPHRO: And I am telling the truth, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Tell me then, by Zeus, what is that excellent deed (τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον) that the gods achieve, using us as their servants (ὑπηρέταις)?

EUTHYPHRO: Many fine things (πολλὰ καὶ καλά), Socrates. (trans. Grube, adapted)

T13) Plato, *Apology*, 37e-38a:

SOCRATES: Perhaps someone might say: But Socrates, if you leave us will you not be able to live quietly, without talking? Now this is the most difficult point on which to convince some of you. If I say that it is impossible for me to keep quiet because that means disobeying the god (τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν), you will not believe me and will think I am being ironical. On the other hand, if I say that the greatest good allotted to a man (τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν) is to discuss every day about virtue and those other things about which you hear me conversing and examining myself and others, for the unexamined life is not worth living for men, you will believe me even less. (trans. Grube, adapted)

T14) Xenophon, *Apology*, 14:

When the jurors heard this, they became noisy, with some disbelieving his words, others jealous that he had been allotted by the gods greater benefits than they themselves (παρὰ θεῶν μειζόνων ἢ αὐτοὶ τυγχάνοι). (trans. MacLeod, adapted)

T15) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.3.4:

If he [Socrates] was of the opinion that he received signs from the gods (σημαίνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν), he could no more be persuaded to act contrary to the signs than if someone should persuade him to take a blind guide who did not know the way on a trip instead of one who could see and did know the way. And he denounced the folly of others who did something contrary to the signs from the gods (καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ μωρίαν κατηγορεῖ, οἵτινες παρὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν σημαίνόμενα ποιοῦσιν) because they were on their guard against losing their reputation among human beings. He himself looked down on everything human in comparison to counsel from the gods (αὐτὸς δὲ πάντα τὰνθρώπινα ὑπερεώρα πρὸς τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν συμβουλίαν). (trans. Bonnette)

T16) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 4.3.16-18:

SOCRATES: How, then, would one honor gods any more nobly or piously than by doing as they themselves order (ὡς αὐτοὶ κελεύουσιν, οὕτω ποιῶν)?... So one should leave nothing undone in

honoring the gods according to his capacity, and hope for the greatest goods (ἐλπίζειν τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ). For it would not be moderate for someone to hope for more from others than from those able to be useful in the most important things (τῶν τὰ μέγιστα ὠφελεῖν δυναμένων), nor would it be moderate to hope for this other than if one would please them (τούτοις ἀρέσκοι). And how would he please them more than if he obeyed them in the highest degree? (ἀρέσκοι δὲ πῶς ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ ὡς μάλιστα πείθοιτο αὐτοῖς;) By saying such things and himself doing them (τοιαῦτα μὲν δὴ λέγων τε καὶ αὐτὸς ποιῶν) he rendered his companions both more pious and more moderate. (trans. Bonnette, adapted)

T17) Xenophon, *Apology*, 14-17:

SOCRATES: Once, when Chaerephon enquired about me at Delphi before many witnesses, Apollo pronounced in reply that no man was more free-spirited or juster or more disciplined (μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μήτε δικαιοτέρων μήτε σωφρονέστερον) than I. When these further statements were heard by the jurors and caused still greater uproar among them, Socrates spoke again: “But, gentlemen, the god had greater things to say in oracles about Lycurgus, the lawgiver to the Spartans, than he did about me. For it is said that when he was entering the temple, the god addressed him saying: “I am pondering whether to call you a god or a man.” But he didn’t liken me to a god, merely judging me to be far superior to other men (ἀνθρώπων δὲ πολλῶν προέκρινεν ὑπερφέρειν). I don’t want you to take the god’s word about this off-hand, but to examine each of the god’s pronouncements in detail. For whom do you know less enslaved (ἥττον... δουλεύοντα) than me to the appetites of the body, or whom amongst men more free-spirited (ἐλευθεριώτερον) than I am, I who accept gifts or payment from nobody? Whom could you reasonably consider juster (δικαιοτέρων) than the one so well adapted to his present situation as to need nothing extra from others? And how could anyone reasonably fail to call me a wise man (σοφὸν... ἄνδρα), me who, from the moment I began to understand speech, have never yet stopped seeking and learning any good thing I could? And don’t you find any proof that my labor (ἐπόνου) was not in vain in the fact that many citizens aspiring to virtue and many non-Athenians too choose to associate with me (ἐμοὶ ξυνεῖναι) in preference to all others? (trans. MacLeod, adapted)

T18) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.6.10:

SOCRATES: You seem, Antiphon, like one who thinks that happiness (εὐδαιμονίαν) is luxury and extravagance. But I, for my part, hold that to need nothing is divine (τὸ... μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι), that to need as little as possible is nearest to the divine, and that what is divine is the most powerful thing (τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον), and what is nearest to the divine is nearest to what is most powerful. (trans. Bonnette, adapted)

T19) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 4.3.3:

SOCRATES: “Tell me, Euthydemus,” he began, “has it ever occurred to you to reflect on the care (ὡς ἐπιμελῶς) the gods have taken to provide human beings with what they need?” (trans. Bonnette, adapted)

T20) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 4.3.9-10:

“For myself,” exclaimed Euthydemus, “I begin to doubt whether after all the gods are occupied in any other work than to care about human beings (τί ἐστι τοῖς θεοῖς ἔργον ἢ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύειν). The one difficulty I feel is that the other animals (τᾶλλα ζῷα) also enjoy these blessings.”
“Yes,” replied Socrates, “and is it not evident that they too receive life and food for the sake of human beings (ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκα)? For what creature reaps so many benefits as man from goats and sheep and horses and oxen and asses and the other animals? He owes more to them, in my opinion, than to the fruits of the earth. At the least they are not less valuable to him for food and commerce; in fact a large portion of mankind does not use the products of the earth for food, but lives on the

milk and cheese and flesh they get from live stock. Moreover, all men tame and domesticate the useful kinds of animals, and make them their fellow-workers in war and many other undertakings.” “There too I agree with you, seeing that animals far stronger than human beings become so entirely subject to them that they put them to any use they want.” (trans. Bonnette, adapted)

T21) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 4.3.12-13:

EUTHYDEMUS: “Truly, Socrates, it does appear that the gods devote much care (πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν) to human beings.”

SOCRATES: “Yet again, in so far as we are powerless of ourselves to foresee what will be useful for us in the future, the gods help us (αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν συνεργεῖν), revealing by divination to inquirers what is going to happen, and teaching how to obtain the best results (διδάσκοντας ἢ ἂν ἄριστα γίγνοιτο).”

EUTHYDEMUS: “With you, Socrates, they seem to deal even more friendly than with other human beings (Σοὶ... εὐκόσμητον ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι), if it is true that, even unasked, they warn you by signs what to do and what not to do.” (trans. Bonnette, adapted)

T22) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.1.9:

And he said that what the gods permit to be done by those who have learned, one should learn, but that what is not clear to human beings one should try to ascertain from the gods through divination, for the gods give signs to those toward whom they are gracious (οἷς ἂν ὄσιν ἴλεω). (trans. Bonnette)

T23) Xenophon, *Apology*, 32:

To me he [Socrates] seems to have been allotted a fate favoured by the gods (ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ θεοφιλοῦς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι); for he left the most toilsome thing in life (τοῦ... βίου τὸ χαλεπώτατον ἀπέλιπε), but was allotted the most untroubled of deaths (τῶν δὲ θανάτων τοῦ ῥάστου ἔτυχεν). (trans. MacLeod, adapted)

T24) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 3.9.15:

And he said that the best and the dearest to the gods (θεοφιλεστάτους) are, in farming, those who do well (εὖ πράττοντας) in farming affairs and, in medicine, those who do well in medical affairs and, in political life, those who do well in political affairs. And he said that the one who does well in nothing is neither useful nor dear to the gods (οὔτε χρήσιμον... οὔτε θεοφιλή). (trans. Bonnette)

T25) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.3.1:

I shall now write down as much as I recall of how in fact, in my opinion, he used to be useful to those who associated with him (ὠφελεῖν ἐδόκει... τοὺς συνόντας), partly by showing himself in deed (ἔργῳ) as the sort of person he himself was, and partly by conversing (διαλεγόμενος). (trans. Bonnette, adapted)

T26) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 4.8.2-3

For it is agreed that no human being within memory has borne death more nobly. For it was necessary for him to live thirty days after the judgment—due to the Delian festival, being during that month and the law allowing no one to be put to death by the public until the mission returned from Delos—and during this time he was visible to all his acquaintances living in no way other than during the previous time. And yet previously, of all human beings, he was most admired for living in good spirits (εὐθύμως) and contentedly (εὐκόλως). And how could someone die more nobly than in this manner (καὶ πῶς ἂν τις κάλλιον ἢ οὕτως ἀποθάνοι)? Or what sort of death would be more noble than the death one dies most nobly? What sort of death would be happier (εὐδαιμονέστερος) than the most noble? Or what sort would be dearer to the gods than the happiest (ποῖος θεοφιλέστερος τοῦ εὐδαιμονεστάτου;)? (trans. Bonnette)

T27) Plato, *Apology*, 31c-e:

SOCRATES: It may seem strange that while I go around and give this advice privately and interfere in private affairs, I do not venture to go to the assembly and there advise the city. You have heard me give the reason for this in many places. Something divine or daemonic happens within me (μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται) which Meletus has ridiculed in his deposition. This began when I was a child. It is a voice (φωνή τις), and whenever it speaks it turns me away (ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει) from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me (προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε) to do anything. This is what has prevented me from taking part in public affairs, and I think it was quite right to prevent me. Be sure, men of Athens, that if I had long ago attempted to take part in politics, I should have died long ago, and was useful neither to you nor to myself (οὔτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν). (trans. Grube, adapted)

T28) Plato, *Republic* VI, 496c-d:

SOCRATES: Finally, my own case (τὸ δ' ἡμέτερον) is hardly worth mentioning—the daemonic sign (τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον)—because it has happened to no one before me, or to only a very few (ἢ γὰρ πού τινι ἄλλῳ ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονεν). Now, the members of this small group have tasted how pleasant and joyful a possession this is (ὥς ἡδὺ καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτήμα). (trans. Grube, revised by Reeve, adapted)

T29) Plato, *Apology*, 40a-c:

SOCRATES: A surprising thing has happened to me, jurymen—you I would rightly call jurymen. At all previous times my familiar prophetic power, that of the daemonic being (ἢ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου), frequently opposed me, even in small matters, when I was about to do something wrong, but now that, as you can see for yourselves, I was faced with what one might think, and what is generally thought to be, the worst of evils, the divine sign (τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον) has not opposed me, either when I left home at dawn, or when I came into court, or at any time that I was about to say something during my speech. Yet in other talks it often held me back in the middle of my speaking, but now it has opposed no word or deed of mine. What do I think is the reason for this? I will tell you. What has happened to me may well be a good thing (κινδυνεύει γὰρ μοι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι), and those of us who believe death to be an evil are certainly mistaken. I have convincing proof of this, for it is impossible that my familiar sign (τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον) did not oppose me if I was not about to do what was good (ἀγαθὸν πράξειν). (trans. Grube, adapted)

T30) Plato, *Apology*, 41c-d:

SOCRATES: You too must be of good hope as regards death, gentlemen of the jury, and keep this one truth in mind, that a good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death, and that his affairs are not neglected by the gods. What has happened to me now has not happened of itself, but it is clear to me that it was better for me (βέλτιον.. μοι) to die now and to escape from trouble. That is why my sign (τὸ σημεῖον) did not oppose me at any point. (trans. Grube, adapted)

T31) Xenophon, *Apology*, 13:

SOCRATES: Others name the sources of the announcements as birds, utterances, omens and prophets, I call this source of mine “something daemonic” (δαιμόνιον) and think that in using this name I am speaking with greater truth and piety than those who attribute the power of the gods to birds. The proof that I am not telling lies against the god is this: I have reported the counsels of the god to numerous friends, and never yet have I been proved mistaken. (trans. MacLeod, adapted)

T32) Xenophon, *Apology*, 12:

SOCRATES: But as for new daemonic beings (καινά... δαιμόνια), how could I be introducing them by saying that the voice of the god reveals itself to me by signaling what needs to be done (θεοῦ μοι

φωνή φαίνεται σημαίνουσα ὅ τι χρῆ ποιεῖν)? For it is the same with those who use the cries of birds and the utterances of humans; they are indeed guided by voices. (trans. MacLeod, adapted)

T33) Plato, *Apology*, 33b-c:

SOCRATES: Why then do some people enjoy spending considerable time in my company? You have heard why, men of Athens; I have told you the whole truth. They enjoy (χαίρουσιν) hearing those being questioned who think they are wise, but are not. And this is not unpleasant (οὐκ ἀηδές). To do this has, as I say, been ordered to me by the god (προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ), by means of oracles and dreams, and in every other way that a divine dispensation (θεία μοῖρα) has ever ordered (προσέταξε) a man to do anything. (trans. Grube, adapted)

T34) Ps.-Plato, *Theages*, 128b-d:

THEAGES: You see, father? I really don't think that Socrates is actually willing to associate with me, and yet I would be prepared to if he were willing. But he is only playing games with us. I know some people my age, and some a little older, who were nothing before they associated with him, but after associating even for a very short time with him became obviously better (βελτίους) than all of those they had been worse than before.

SOCRATES: Do you know how that's possible, son of Demodocus?

THEAGES: Yes, by Zeus, I do: if you agree, I will become like them, too.

SOCRATES: No, sir; you don't understand. I'll have to explain it to you. There's a certain daemonic being (τι... δαιμόνιον) which, by divine dispensation (θεία μοῖρα), has been with me from childhood. It's a voice (φωνή) that, when it comes, always signals me to turn away from what I'm about to do, but never prescribes anything. And if some one of my friends consults with me and the voice comes, it is the same: it prohibits him and won't allow him to act. (trans. Smith, adapted)

T35) Aeschines, *Alcibiades*, SSR VI A 53 (= Ael. Aristid. *De rhet.* 1.61-62; = Pentassuglio fr. 81):

[SOCRATES]: If I thought that it was by some craft (τινι τέχνῃ) that I was able to be useful (ὠφελῆσαι), I would find myself guilty of great folly. But in fact I thought that in the case of Alcibiades this [i.e. the ability to be useful] was given to me by divine dispensation (θεία μοῖρα)... Also he who possesses no craft is able to be useful (ὠφελεῖν) to men. Also many sick people become healthy; some of them thanks to a human craft (ἀνθρωπίνη τέχνῃ), others thanks to a divine dispensation. So those who are healed thanks to a human craft are healed by physicians, while those who are healed thanks to a divine dispensation are led by a desire toward the beneficial (ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦς ἄγει ἐπὶ τὸ ὄνησον). (trans. Kahn, adapted)

T36) Aeschines, *Alcibiades*, SSR VI A 53 (= Ael. Aristid. *De rhet.* 1.74; = Pentassuglio fr. 82):

[SOCRATES]: Because of the love that I happened to feel (διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα ὃν ἐτύγγανον ἐρῶν) for Alcibiades, I happened to suffer an experience no different from that of the Bacchae. Indeed, when the Bacchae become full of the god (ἔνθεοι), they are able to draw milk and honey from wells from which others cannot even draw water. So it is with me, although I have no wisdom that I can teach (οὐδὲν μάθημα ἐπιστάμενος) and so be useful (ὠφελήσαιμι' ἄν) to a man, nevertheless I imagined that I could make him better staying with him, through my love (διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν βελτίω ποιῆσαι). (trans. Kahn, adapted)

T37) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 4.8.5-7:

[SOCRATES]: "Yes, by Zeus, Hermogenes," he said, "I have already attempted to think out my defense to the jurors, but the daemonic being (τὸ δαιμόνιον) opposed it." And he himself said, "You say things to be marveled at." He said, "Do you marvel if it is better (βέλτιον) for the god (τῷ θεῷ) that I end my life now? Don't you know that up to this time I, for my part, would not have yielded to any human being that he lived either a better (βέλτιον) or more pleasant (ἡδιον) life than mine? For I think that those live in an excellent way (ἄριστα... ζῆν) who best attend to becoming as good

as possible (ὡς βελτίστους γίνεσθαι), and that those live most pleasantly (ἥδιστα) who most perceive that they are becoming better (ὅτι βελτίους γίνονται). “These things I, for my part, perceived up to this time befalling me (ἐμαυτῷ συμβαίνοντα), and, finding myself (ἐντυγχάνων) with others and comparing myself to them, I have continued in this judgment about myself. And not only I, but my friends also continue to feel thus towards me, not because of their love for me (διὰ τὸ φιλεῖν ἐμέ)... but because they think that they too would become better (βέλτιστοι γίνεσθαι) by staying with me. (trans. Bonnette, adapted)

T38) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.1.2-4:

For he visibly sacrificed often at home and often at the common altars of the city; and it was not difficult to see him using divination. For it had been widely bandied about that Socrates said that the daemonic being (τὸ δαιμόνιον) gave him signs; and, in my opinion, it is especially for this reason that they accused him of bringing in new daemonic beings (δαιμόνια). But he brought in nothing newer than others who consult birds of omen, sayings, portents, and sacrificial victims because they believe in divination. For seekers of divination suppose not that the birds or those they meet by chance. I know what is advantageous (τὰ συμφέροντα) for them, but that the gods signals what is advantageous through them; and Socrates held the same. However, while the majority say that they are both turned back and turned forward by the birds and by those they meet, Socrates spoke just as he judged, for he said that the daemonic being (τὸ δαιμόνιον) gave him signs. And he told many of his companions to do some things and not to do others on the grounds that the daemonic being (τὸ δαιμόνιον) had given a sign. And it was advantageous (συνέφερε) for those who obeyed him, while those who did not obey regretted it. (trans. Bonnette, adapted)